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MARSHALL V. BARLOW'S, INC.: ARE WARRANTLESS 
ROUTINE OSHA INSPECTIONS A VIOLATION OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT? 
Lynn G. Weissberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One out of every four American workers is exposed on the job to 
some substance capable of causing death or disease.) One hundred 
thousand workers die each year from job-related injuries and di-
seases.2 In 1970, Congress responded to the growing national prob-
lem of workplace safety and health by passing the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act). 3 The OSH Act created the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which sets 
mandatory standards governing the condition of various workplaces 
and conducts inspections to ensure compliance with the standards.~ 
One of the most controversial and frequently litigated aspects of the 
OSH Act is the constitutionality of its provision that authorizes 
OSHA inspections without a search warrant. 5 
On September 11, 1975, Mr. Ferrol G. Barlow, President of Bar-
low's, Inc. of Pocatello, Idaho, challenged the authority of OSHA to 
make a routine warrantless inspection of his electrical, plumbing, 
and air-conditioning installation business by denying admittance to 
an inspector.8 Several months later, Mr. Barlow again refused to 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1977, at 1, Col. 2. 
2 Id., Dec. 20, 1976, §I, at 1, Col. 4. Black lung, asbestosis, asbestos-caused cancer, beryl-
lium disease, and vinyl chloride-caused liver cancer are the most familiar examples of occupa-
tional illness. While statistics for occupational diseases are difficult to obtain, HEW esti-
mates some 390,000 new cases of occupational disease each year, and as many as 100,000 
deaths. N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 3-4 (1976). 
• 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970). 
• Id. §§ 654(a)(2), 657(a). 
, Id. § 657(a). 
• Events are retold in Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976) (three judge 
court). 
423 
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admit an OSHA inspector, who this time had a court order7 to 
compel entry, inspection, and investigation. The next day, Barlow 
filed a complaint in federal district court seeking temporary and 
permanent injunctions against OSHA inspections on the ground 
that they are inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. A three 
judge panel held that the provisions' of the OSH Act that 
"attempted to authorize warrantless inspections ... are unconsti-
tutional as being violative of the Fourth Amendment."8 In Marshall 
v. Barlow's,. Inc., 9 the United States Supreme Court will hear the 
appeal of the panel's decision and will consider for the first time 
whether the Act's warrantless inspection provision violates the 
Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches"o 
This article will explore the constitutional ramifications of the 
Barlow's case, examining whether the Fourth Amendment permits 
routine OSHA inspections without a warrant and whether constitu-
tionally sufficient probable cause exists to justify these inspections. 
This examination will be preceded by a discussion of the statutory 
and regulatory requirements of OSHA inspections and by a look at 
basic Fourth Amendment doctrine, as applied to traditional crimi-
nal searches and administrative inspections. 
II. OSHA INSPECTIONS 
The OSH Act is the first comprehensive piece of legislation in 
the area of occupational safety and health. 11 Its ambitious purpose 
is "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the 
nation safe and healthful working conditions."12 The Act authorizes 
OSHN3 to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards 
7 [d. at 439. At a show cause hearing on Dec. 30, 1975, the Secretary's order was granted. 
Brief for Appellants at 9, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted, 430 U.S. 964 (1977). 
M Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. at 442.The court permanently enjoined the Secretary 
from conducting inspections pursuant to 29 U.S.C.§ 657(a) (1970), and specifically from 
inspecting Barlow's. On Feb. 3, 1977, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stayed the district court's order 
except as it applied to Barlow's.429 U.S. 1347 (1977). 
• Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976) (three judge court), injunction 
stayed sub. nom., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 429 U.S. 1347 (1977), prob. juris. noted, 430 U.S. 
964 (1977). 
"' U.S. Const. amend IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or things to be seized." 
" The Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970), was a forerunner of the OSH 
Act. 
12 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). 
t3 Although OSHA is charged with administering the Act, it is just one of five federal bodies 
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for businesses affecting commerce and requires each employer to 
comply with these standards. 14 In cases not covered by specific stan-
dards, the employer has a general statutory duty to "furnish. . . a 
place of employment . . . free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm. "15 
The Act requires OSHA officers to inspect and investigate all 
pertinent conditions, structures, and machines of any place of em-
ployment. ls Different categories of inspections-routine, emergency, 
and those prompted by an employee complaint-are set out in the 
statute. 17 OSHA Area Directors select the sites for routine inspec-
tions according to established scheduling procedures. IR Routine 
inspections are based on accident experience and the number of 
employees exposed to a hazard and are planned after consideration 
of the injury/illness rate for that industry. 19 
Advance notice of an inspection is statutorily prohibited;20 ac-
designated by statute to provide the administrative, scientific, and legal support necessary 
to implement the Act. The others are: the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health, in HEW, 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1970); the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission, an independent, quasi-judicial body, id. § 661; the National Advisory Committee 
on Occupational Safety and Health, appointed by the Secretary of Labor to advise the 
Secretaries of Labor and HEW on matters relating to the administration of the Act, id. § 656; 
and the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, a Presidential Com-
mission authorized to carry out a one-year study and evaluation of state workman's compen-
sation laws, reporting in July, 1972, id. § 676. See N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 
(1976). 
u 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1970). 
'" [d. § 654(a)(1). This provision is commonly referred to as the general duty clause. It is 
the basis of many citations issued against employers. See Morey, The General Duty Clause 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1973). The general 
duty obligation does not appear as useful as the specific OSHA standards since the level of 
safety it establishes is predicated on what is already considered normal for any given industry, 
regardless of how patently hazardous that may be. It is particularly problematic because most 
of the 13,000 toxic substances in commercial use today are not covered by specific OSHA 
standards and, therefore, can only be covered by the general duty norm. See Ashford and 
Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions: Employee Rights Under the Labor Management Relations 
Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 802 (1977). 
" 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) (1970). 
17 [d. § 657(a), (f). The OSHA Field Operations Manual, reprinted in [1976] 1 EMPLOYEE 
SAFETY & HEALTH (CCH) H009, establishes the priorities of these categories as follows: 1) 
imminent dangers, 2) fatality and catastrophe inspections, 3) employee complaints, 4) re-
gional programmed (routine) inspections. In a typical three-month period, 33% of OSHA 
inspections were initiated by employee complaints, 24% were accident and follow-up, and 
43% were routine. 
" OSHA Field Operations Manual, reprinted in [1976] 1 EMPLOYEE SAFETY & HEALTH 
(CCH) ~4327.2. 
'" [d. ~4327.2(3)(d). 
'" 29 U.S.C. § 651(10) (1970). 
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cordingly, persons providing such notice are subject to criminal 
sanctions.21 Upon presenting credentials to the employer, an OSHA 
inspector is authorized by the Act to enter the workplace without 
delay.22 However, the inspector must call during regular working 
hours or at other reasonable times, and the inspection must be 
conducted within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner.23 
Further, representatives of both the employer and the employees 
have the opportunity to accompany the inspector on the tour.24 Reg-
ulations provide that inspectors must explain the nature and pur-
pose of the inspection25 and avoid unreasonable disruption in the 
operations of the employer's business.28 The scope of the inspection 
is limited to areas, materials, and machines with which employees 
have contact, and to records directly relevant to the purpose of the 
inspection - the detection of safety and health hazards: 27 OSHA 
inspectors have statutory authority to inspect only for OSHA viola-
tions. Although the Act contains no provision concerning what ac-
tion an inspector should take if an employer refuses to permit an 
inspection, a regulation instructs inspectors to consult with his/her 
superiors who will then take "appropriate action, including compul-
sory process, if necessary. "28 
III. BACKGROUND: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. Traditional Doctrine in Criminal Searches 
The Fourth Amendment was passed in reaction to the general 
21 [d. § 666<0. 
" Similar or identical inspection provisions are included in inany federal statutes. See, e.g., 
7 U.S.C. § 136(g) (Supp. V 1975) (Environmental Pesticide Control Act); 21 U.S.C. § 603 
(1970) (Sec. of Agriculture's inspection of meat and meat products); 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) 
(fair Labor Standards Act); 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1970) (Coal Mine Health and Safety Act); 33 
U.S.C. § 467(a) (Supp. V 1975) (Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9(a)(2) 
(1970) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6 (1970) (Air Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2035(c), 2051 (1970) (Atomic Energy Act); 45 U.S.C. § 437(c) (1970) (Railroad Safety Act). 
23 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). 
" [d. § 657(e). This is called the "walkaround." 
.. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.7(a) (1976) . 
.. [d. § 1903.7(d). 
27 [d. § 1903.3(a). If a violation is discovered, a citation is issued to the employer setting a 
reasonable time for its abatement and assessing a civil monetary penalty based on the sever-
ity of the hazard and the employer's diligence in the past to comply with the Act. For 
citations, penalties, and administrative review procedures, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 658, 660, 662, 666 
(1970). 
28 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1976). 
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warrants in England29 and the writs of assistance in the colonies,:1II 
which authorized general searches with unlimited discretion based 
on mere suspicion.31 Its basic purpose is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental 
officials. To achieve this end, it establishes a broad prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and goes on to proscribe 
the issuance of search warrants except on a showing of probable 
cause.32 
No search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if con-
ducted without probable cause.33 In an ordinary criminal case, prob-
able cause exists when there is sufficient evidence to warrant a 
person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or 
is being committed and that the premises to be searched contain 
legally seizable material. 34 Before a warrant issues, a judicial officer 
must make a determination of probable cause based on evidence 
presented by the police,35 thereby interposing an impartial and de-
tached magistrate between the private citizen and the law enforce-
ment agent.36 A valid search warrant contains a particular descrip-
tion of both the premises to be searched and the objects to be seized. 
When a search is made without a warrant, the initial determination 
of probable cause rests with the law enforcement officer. This deter-
mination can be challenged later at a pre-trial judicial proceeding . 
.. A general warrant was a general arrest warrant issued by the Secretary of State on mere 
suspicion. 
30 Writs of assistance enabled customs officers to conduct general searches. Such writs 
could be used with unlimited discretion. See J. LANDYSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE 
SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937). 
3\ Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1966); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). 
32 See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1973-
74). 
33 See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). 
" Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-
76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
35 The test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), for the reliability of an 
informant's information is that it must reveal (1) underlying circumstances showing reason 
to believe that the informant is a credible person, and (2) underlying circumstances showing 
the basis of the conclusion reached by the informant. [d. at 114. 
3R Justice Jackson has well stated the role of the magistrate: 
The point of the fourth amendment,. . . is not that it denies law enforcement the support 
of usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in 
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime. . . . When the right to privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as 
a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer not by a policeman or government enforcement 
agent. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1928). 
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As a rule, a search pursuant to a warrant issued on a magistrate's 
finding of traditional probable cause is "reasonable" under the 
Fourth Amendment.37 Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed a 
strong preference for the use of search warrants. 38 However, searches 
without a warrant are not per se unreasonable and have been upheld 
in a carefully defined class of cases39 - for example, emergencies 
where it would be impossible for the law enforcement agent to pro-
cure a warrant before taking action.40 The Supreme Court has also 
identified certain situations in which warrantless searches are 
"reasonable" even if based on less than traditional probable cause. 
In these situations a warrant is still preferred but not required. ~I 
B. The Rule and Its Exceptions in Administrative Inspections 
The Supreme Court has departed from traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrine in the area of administrative inspections, 
where a governmental agency attempts to detect violations of its 
administrative codes or regulations. The Court has both relaxed the 
traditional probable cause required and started to define the cir-
cumstances in which a warrantless inspection is reasonable. 
1. Camara and See 
The companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court42 and See v. 
City of Seattle43 are the starting points for current44 Supreme Court 
authority regarding administrative searches. In each case, an occu-
pant refused a warrantless inspection on the ground that the Fourth 
Amendment required a search warrant, and the Court was faced 
with the issue of "whether administrative inspection programs vio-
late Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against 
37 See id. 
3M United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). 
3. Although not expressly exempted from the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
established some specific and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, for 
example: a limited search of an auto on the highway, a search incident to a valid arrest, and 
a seizure of evidence in "plain view." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1973) 
(dissent) . 
.. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit). 
" E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20-22 (1968) (stop and frisk). 
'z 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See generally LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth 
Amendment: The Camara & See Cases, 1967 S. CT. REv. 1. 
.. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
" Camara overruled Frank v. State of Md., 359 U.S. 360 (1969), which had upheld warrant-
less housing code inspections. 
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the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. "45 
In Camara, a city housing inspector attempted to inspect residen-
tial premises for building code violations48 under a municipal hous-
ing code, which authorized inspectors to enter at reasonable times 
to "perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code."47 
~a locked commercial warehouse was the subject of an inspec-
I ~~~~,"b~.'the Seattle Fire Department conducted pursuant to the 
(
city's fire code, which authorized inspections "as often as may be 
necessary" to ascertain and correct any violations of the code or any 
\ othet ordinance pertaining to fire hazards.48 Both the Camara and 
\ See ordinances provided criminal sanctions for refusing to consent 
\ to a warrantless inspection.49 
The Supreme Court held that both the residential occupant in 
Camara and the commercial occupant in See had a constitutional 
/ right to insist that the inspector obtain a search warrant, and, there-
fore, that neither could be convicted for refusing to consent to a 
warrantless inspection.50 The Court found that fire, health, and 
housing code inspection programs could operate within a reasonable 
search warrant requirement so that the burden of obtaining a 
warrant would not frustrate the purpose of the inspection. 51 Noting 
that the discretion of the inspector needed to be circumscribed by 
a neutral magistrate issuing warrants,52 the Court asserted that 
"broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized re-
view."53 
Importantly, the Court announced a new standard of probable 
I. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 525. 
II [d. 
17 [d. at 526; SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HOUSING CODE §503, reads: 
Right to Enter Building. Authorized employees of the city departments or city agencies, 
so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of 
proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, 
or premises in the city to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code. 
I. [d.; SEA'ITLE, WASH., FIRE CODE §8.01.050, reads: 
Inspection of Building and Premises. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and 
he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may 
be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions 
liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other 
ordinance concerning fire hazards. 
I. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528 n.2; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 542 
n.l. 
50 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 546. 
51 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 533. 
52 [d. at 532. 
'" [d. at 533. 
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cause. Recognizing that routine administrative inspections are nei-
ther triggered by a suspicion that a specific violation exists in a 
particular building, nor designed to ferret out specific evidence 
thought to be on the premises, it found the traditional standard of 
probable cause to be inappropriate. The Court concluded that a less 
strict standard of probable cause is reasonable in this situation, 
since the need to search outweighs the invasion that the search 
entails.54 This conclusion was based on several factors, including the 
impersonal nature of the inspections, the relatively limited invasion 
of privacy involved, the long history of judicial and public accept-
ance of area code-enforcement inspections, and the fact that only 
door to door canvassing can prevent or abate dangerous conditions." 
Accordingly, Camara announced a new, flexible standard ofprob-
able cause for administrative inspections: probable cause exists if 
reasonable administrative or legislative standards for conducting an 
area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling, 56 
and if a valid public interest justifies the intrusion. 57 In determining 
whether these reasonable legislative or administrative standards 
existed in the Camara case, the Court considered the amount of 
time since the last inspection, the nature of the building to be in-
spected, and the condition of the entire area.58 Particularized infor-
mation about the condition of a certain dwelling is not required.59 
The governmental interest at stake, the prevention of conditions 
hazardous to public health and safety,60 when viewed in combina-
tion with these standards, was sufficient to justify the intrusion. 
Thus the Court concluded that Camara-type inspections could 
thereafter be conducted under this new, flexible standard or prob-
able cause. 
2. Colonnade and Biswell 
In distinguishing area code inspections from federal regulatory 
inspections, the See Court implied that exceptions to the Camara-
•• Id. at 537. See Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: 
A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1011 
(1973) . 
.. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537. 
50 Id. at 538. See Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REV. 607 (1974). 
" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 539. 
58 Id. at 538 . 
.. Id. 
eo Id. at 533. 
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See warrant requirement were possible.B1 One exception came three 
years later in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States.82 Without 
a warrant, and without the owner's permission, federal inspectors 
from the Alcohol and Tobacco Division of the Internal Revenue 
Service forcibly entered a locked storeroom and seized illegal liquor . 
The inspection was authorized by provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code which conferred broad authority to enter and inspect the 
premises of federally licensed retail liquor dealers.83 The Court held 
the search constitutional. 84 In its decision, the Court did not ex-
pressly address the issue of probable cause, but one can infer that 
it employed the flexible standard of probable cause developed in 
Camara, because the routine inspection would not have met the 
traditional standard. The Court was explicit, however, in upholding 
the warrantlessness of the search. It recognized Congress' broad 
authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and 
emphasized the long history of governmental supervision and 
inspection of the liquor industry. 85 In light of the continued federal 
scrutiny of all facets of the manufacture, transport, and sale of 
alcohol, the Court concluded that a warrantless inspection was rea-
sonable. 
Exceptions to the Camara-See warrant requirement were broad-
ened again two years later in United States v. Biswell. 88 In Biswell, 
the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless inspection of a federally 
licensed firearms dealer conducted pursuant to a provision of the 
Gun Control Act of 1968,87 which authorized entry during business 
hours for the purpose of inspecting records and firearms kept or 
" See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 546. Two recent cases illustrate the limits of the 
Colonnade-Biswell exception. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the 
Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search by a roving patrol of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service that was purportedly authorized by statute and regulations. Then, in 
Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), an inspector of the 
Colorado Health Department conducted daylight visual pollution tests of smoke emissions. 
The inspector had entered the outdoor premises of the business without the owner's consent 
and without a warrant. The Court expressly reaffirmed Camara and See, but found them not 
applicable to the instant case. Instead, the Court relied on the "open fields" exception to the 
Fourth Amendment to hold that "the invasion of property, if it can be said to exist, is abstract 
and theoretical." 416 U.S. at 865. 
" 397 U.S. 72 (1970) . 
• 3 26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606 (1970) . 
.. Colonnade Catering Corp.v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) . 
•• [d. Actually, Congress did not authorize forcible, warrantless entries, but rather made it 
an offense for the licensee to refuse inspection . 
.. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1970). 
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stored by the dealer on the premises. 6s As in Colonnade, one must 
infer the use of a flexible standard of probable cause. However, the 
Court did mention several factors which inclined it to approve the 
warrantless nature of the inspection. Although the firearms industry 
does not have as deeply rooted a history of governmental control as 
the liquor industry, firearms dealers are subject to pervasive govern-
ment regulation.8u Thus, the Court viewed the inspections as an 
essential part of the regulatory scheme and only a limited threat to 
a justifiable privacy expectation. If the inspections are to serve as 
credible deterrents, the Court reasoned, unannounced inspections 
are crucial, and a warrant prerequisite could easily frustrate the 
success of the inspection.70 Further, it was observed that the regula-
tory inspection procedure is carefully limited with respect to time, 
place, and scope.71 It remains unclear exactly how these considera-
tions were weighed; nevertheless the Court concluded that, because 
"inspections further an urgent federal interest, and the possibilities 
of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, 
the inspection may proceed without a warrant where specifically 
authorized by statute."72 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS ROUTINE OSHA 
INSPECTIONS 
A. Applicability of the Biswell Considerations 
Whether OSHA inspectors can conduct warrantless routine 
inspections depends on whether the Colonnade-Biswell exceptions 
to the Camara-See warrant requirement control. A close reading of 
the Biswell decision reveals a comprehensive treatment of the fre-
quently overlapping factors which lead the Supreme Court to find 
a warrantless inspection constitutional: (1) whether the statute is 
SUfficiently limited to curtail the discretion of the inspector,13 (2) 
whether there is pervasive federal regulation to further a valid gov-
ernmental interest,74 (3) whether the owners or occupants of the 
premises have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy,75 and (4) whether 
.. [d. § 923(g). 
II United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972). 
7. [d. at 316. 
71 [d. at 315. 
72 [d. at 316. 
73 [d. 
" [d. at 315. 
75 [d. at 316. 
1978] OSHA INSPECTIONS 433 
a warrant requirement would frustrate the purpose of the inspec-
tion.7ft It is difficult to assess fully the factors that entered into the 
Court's decision in Biswell because the Court has neither provided 
guidelines concerning the weight and relationship of the various 
factors nor articulated the necessity of having all of the factors 
present for the Biswell exception to control.77 Nevertheless, an anal-
ysis of these factors with respect to routine OSHA inspections indi-
cates that the Biswell exception should control and that warrantless 
routine OSHA inspections are constitutional. 
1. Sufficient Statutory Limits on the Discretion of the Inspector 
In Camara, the Supreme Court perceived a need for a neutral 
third party, a magistrate, to review the discretionary aspects of the 
inspection.78 The Court was concerned that the occupant in this 
situation has "no way of knowing whether enforcement of the mu-' 
nicipal code involved inspection of his premises, no way of knowing 
the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of 
knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper au-
thorization."79 In both Colonnade and Biswell, by contrast, the 
Court found that the inspector did not possess undue discretion 
because of the limited nature, in terms of time, place, and scope, of 
the inspections. In Biswell, for example, each business received in-
formation about the inspections that described the dealer's obliga-
tions and defined the inspector's authority; thus, "the dealer is not 
left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of 
his task. "80 
In administrative inspection cases since Biswell the lower federal 
courts have continued to examine whether the inspector's discretion 
is sufficiently limited by the statutory scheme itself. The Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act81 authorizes inspectors "to enter, at reasona-
ble times, any factory . . . in which food, drugs, or devices or cos-
metics are manufactured . . . and . . . to inspect, at reasonable 
" [d. 
77 See note 145, infra. 
" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
'" [d. 
lIB United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
" 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970). A similar situation existed in United States ex reI. Terraci-
ano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974), in which a 
state narcotics statute authorizing warrantless inspections by the Health Department of 
pharmacist's records relating to narcotics and other drugs was upheld. The court took special 
notice of the fact that the inspections were confined to business hours. 
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times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, 
such factory."82 In upholding warrantless FDA inspections courts 
have stressed the limiting aspects of the inspections, such as the fact 
that inspections are conducted regularly in a reasonable manner 
during business hours by inspectors who are unarmed.83 In reviewing 
a warrantless inspection of a coal mine made pursuant to the Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,84 a federal district 
court found "no real danger that a federal mine inspector will ex-
ceed his authority."85 Since the mine owners have a legal obligation 
to be familiar with and to comply with the Act's mandatory health 
and safety standards, they are aware of the limits of the inspectors' 
lawful powers to search, and they understand that the inspectors 
have authority to inspect the mines for health and safety condi-
tions. 8ft 
The OSH Act, like the FDA statute, stipulates that the inspection 
is limited with regard to time, place, and scope.87 Routine sites are 
selected by the Area Director, not the inspector; thus the discretion 
of an OSHA inspector is at a minimum. As in the case of coal mine 
owners, employers covered by the OSH Act have a statutory obliga-
tion to be familiar with and to comply with the occupational health 
and safety standards promulgated under the Act.88 In addition, 
OSHA inspectors are required to present credentials and outline the 
scope of the inspection to the employer before inspection. 8a OSHA 
inspectors have statutory authority to inspect only for OSHA viola-
tions, and the inspection is limited to areas, materials, and ma-
chines with which employees have contact, and to records directly 
relevant to the purpose of the inspection.ao Thus, the Camara 
Court's concerns about the discretion of the inspector are not appli-
H2 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (1970). 
M3 E.g. United States v. Thriftmart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1970). 
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970) . 
.. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The 
court found that the inspectors have power to search only to further the purpose of the 
legislation. [d. at 50 n.4. The Act does not authorize inspectors to conduct a general search 
of the mine owner's offices. [d. at 51 n.5 . 
.. [d. at 51. 
.7 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). See text and notes, Section II, supra . 
.. [d. § 654(a)(2). 
HI 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1976) . 
.. [d. It does not appear that OSHA inspectors are empowered to search offices or desks to 
inspect records if the employer does not produce them upon request. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (c)(l). 
Instead, compulsory process commanding production of the records is sought on refusal. 
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cable to an OSHA inspection. u1 The OSH Act and regulations so 
prescribe and limit the inspection that a warrant should not be 
required. 
2. Pervasive Federal Regulation to Further a Valid Governmental 
Interest 
Both Colonnade and Biswell involved federally licensed busi-
nesses which were pervasively regulated and, therefore, subject to 
frequent government intervention. Subsequent cases upholding 
warrantless administrative inspections have also involved industries 
with extensive federal controls.u2 For example, a federal district 
court reviewing warrantless coal mine inspectionsu3 reasoned that 
regulated businesses like coal mines in effect consent to the restric-
tions placed on them. U4 Indeed, although both Colonnade and 
Biswell dealt with businesses which were federally licensed, lower 
courts reviewing FDA inspections have found pervasive federal reg-
ulation even without federal licensing, citing the comprehensive and 
rigorously enforced regulations that require frequent inspections.u5 
The fact that Congress has not required the Del Campo business to 
obtain federal licenses to operate is wholly immaterial. Defendants' 
business of manufacturing, processing, packing and distributing food 
products . . . is as 'pervasively regulated' by the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as if it 
were federally licensed. . . . The rationale of Biswell makes no such 
differentiation. 96 
Some courts reviewing OSHA inspections have found that busi-
nesses covered by the Act are not pervasively regulated because they 
" Another distinction between the Camara-See type of inspection is that the OSH Act 
provides an administrative review mechanism to deal with unauthorized actions of the 
inspector. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1970). Camara and See had no comparable review process avail-
able to the occupant. 
'2 See, e.g., Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973) 
(coal mining); United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 
1972) (FDA business); United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333 (D.D.C. 1973) (FDA busi-
ness). 
,3 Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The court 
noted that if the business under consideration were not so inherently dangerous, then its 
decision might be otherwise; the court in this instance could reconcile the statute with the 
Fourth Amendment. [d. at 52 n.7. 
" [d. at 49. 
IS E.g., United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) . 
.. [d. at 1377. 
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are not federally licensed and do not have a history of close regula-
tion, and because OSHA standards, although very detailed, apply 
to only one aspect of the business,91 Moreover, the OSH Act deals 
with all businesses affecting commerce: it is not industry-specific, 
as were the statutes in Colonnade and Biswell. These courts thus 
always look at the issue of pervasive regulation from the perspective 
of the statute which authorizes the inspection. But it is possible for 
one statute to be a part of an overall picture of pervasive regulation. 
OSHA businesses, for instance, are subject to other federal controls 
concerning labor, civil rights, and environmental protection. us The 
cumulative effect of these numerous regulatory statutes could result 
in as equally pervasive regulation as does a single statute such as 
that authorizing FDA inspections.99 The same situation exists in 
either case, namely that a business is frequently intruded upon by 
the government. Thus, multi-statute pervasive regulation should 
satisfy the Biswell factor. If the Supreme Court adopts this less rigid 
view of regulation, then an OSHA business would seem to meet it, 
and a warrant for the inspection would not be required. 
An issue coupled with the factor of federal regulation is whether 
the statutory inspection scheme promotes an important federal in-
terest. The federal interest in Colonnade was securing revenue from 
the liquor industry; 100 in Biswell, it was preventing violent crimes 
and assisting the states in regulating firearms traffic. 101 In cases 
concerning FDA inspections, courts have acknowledged that the 
importance of the regulations to public health puts FDA inspections 
"within the same category of highly-scrutinized endeavors which 
justifiably includes both the liquor and firearms industries."102 In 
United States u. Business Builders, Inc.,103 for example, the court 
" See Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976), appeal 
docketed, No. 76-2020 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 1976); Usery v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., 424 F. 
Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976) (three 
judge court), prob. juris. noted, 430 U.S. 964 (1977). 
t. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. V 1975) (Minimum Wage); 29 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. V 
1975) (Maximum Hours); 29 U.S.C. § 212 (Child Labor Provisions); 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1970) 
(Equal Pay Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-18571 (1970) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e(15) (1970) (Equal Employment Opportunities of Civil Rights Act of 1964); 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 41-77 (1970) (Federal Trade Comm.); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970) (Interstate Commerce Act) . 
.. Although the term "pervasive regulation" has been used extensively, it is unclear 
whether all courts use it with a uniform meaning. 
'00 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1970). 
,., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972). 
'02 United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.D.C. 1973). 
'03 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973). 
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stated that "[i]t would be an affront to common sense to say that 
the public interest is not as deeply involved in the regulation of the 
food industry as it is in the liquor and firearms industries."104 Simi-
larly, in examining coal mine inspections, a federal district court 
considered that the health, safety, and very lives of coal miners are 
jeopardized when mandatory health and safety laws are violated. 105 
In comparison, the federal interest in OSHA inspections-
occupational safety and health-is of equal, if not greater, magni-
tude. 
3. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Premises 
Yet another factor that courts consider in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of warrantless administrative inspections is the relative 
intrusiveness of the inspection. The Camara Court conceded that a 
housing code inspection is "a less hostile intrusion than the typical 
policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime."108 
It found, however, that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake 
are not "merely peripheral."107 In See, the Court admitted that the 
expectation of privacy is presumably less for business premises than 
for a noncommercial building,108 but held that inspections in both 
instances result in significant intrusions on Fourth Amendment 
rights and demand the safeguards of a search warrant. lOB 
The Biswell Court, on the other hand, determined that firearms 
inspections do not pose a threat of impressive dimensions to pri-
vacy.1I0 Dealers in a regulated business like firearms must know that 
all aspects of their business, including records and stock, will be the 
subject of thorough inspections. III Similarly, coal mine owners have 
been held to have a small privacy interest because they must rea-
sonably expect that there will be intrusions onto their premises. 1I2 
The mine owners, in the court's view, have a diminished privacy 
expectation because the mines are open to a large number of work-
ers, thus giving the public the right to ensure that the working 
10' [d. at 143. See also id. at n.1. 
, .. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
, .. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). 
101 [d. 
"" See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967). 
,119 [d. 
II. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). 
"' [d. at 316. 
112 Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
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conditions meet safety standards. 113 The privacy interest of the mine 
operators, according to this view, is far outweighed by the govern-
mental interest in promoting mine safety.u4 
In evaluating the degree of intrusiveness of an OSHA inspection, 
one must keep in mind that only employee work areas are within 
the scope of the inspection;1I5 private offices or any place not fre-
quented by employees would not be included. \l6 There is relatively 
less intrusiveness in an OSHA inspection than in the Camara and 
See inspections. Camara involved a residential dwelling; See con-
cerned a locked storeroom. Clearly an OSHA inspection of employee 
work areas is a more impersonal inspection than is an inspection of 
a dwelling or a locked storeroom.1I7 Moreover, an OSHA inspection 
is even less intrusive than the inspections in Colonnade and Biswell. 
The areas inspected in Colonnade and Biswell, a locked liquor store-
room and a gun storeroom respectively, are more private than the 
semi-public work areas inspected by OSHA. An OSHA inspector 
would have no authority to enter the kinds of areas inspected in 
Colonnade and Biswell. An OSHA business owner, therefore, should 
have a low justifiable expectation of privacy in an employee work 
area. 
4. Possible Frustration of the Purpose of the Inspection 
The final consideration affecting the constitutionality of a war-
rantless administrative inspection is whether a warrant requirement 
would frustrate the purpose of the inspection. Courts are worried 
that an unscrupulous occupant might not allow an inspector to 
enter without a warrant, and then attempt to alter the area to be 
inspected while the inspector procures a warrant from a magis-
trate. IIS Thus, what begins as an unannounced inspection quickly is 
transformed into one for which the occupant has notice - and time 
to prepare. 
In Camara, the Supreme Court concluded that warrants could be 
required without threatening the effectiveness of the inspection. liB 
'13 Id. 
"' Id. See also id. at n.5. 
'15 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). 
"' See Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Sec. of Labor, 519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975). 
"' See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 554 (1967) (dissent). The dissent recognized that 
an area code inspection is impersonal in nature, a factor which contributes t.o its reasonable-
ness. 
"' C{. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
'" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). 
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Since the object of the Camara inspection was to detect building 
code violations, and since such conditions are not easily concealed 
or quickly rectified, the delay caused by obtaining a warrant for an 
objected-to inspection would be insignificant. It was not essential 
that the inspection be unannounced. Significantly, the Court noted 
that the City did not argue that the fire, health, and housing code 
inspection programs could not achieve their goals within the con-
fines of a reasonable search warrant requirement. '2o 
In contrast, the objects of the inspections in Colonnade and 
Biswell, liquor and firearms, are easily removed or hidden. Recog-
nizing this important distinction, the Court found that a warrant 
prerequisite could easily frustrate the inspection because the busi-
ness people would have an opportunity to conceal or remove illegal 
goods from their premises while a warrant was being sought. 121 Thus, 
unannounced, and even frequent, inspections were necessary.122 
Similarly, the need for unannounced warrantless inspections has 
been affirmed in both coal mine'23 and FDA inspections. '24 One court 
noted that the statutory scheme of warrantless coal mine inspec-
tions depends on frequent unannounced inspections, and held that 
imposing a warrant requirement would tend to frustrate the legisla-
tive purpose of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. '25 A 
comparable need for unannounced inspections in FDA cases has 
also been found by the courts.'28 
OSHA inspections, like those in Colonnade and Biswell, involve 
illegal conditions which could be concealed or temporarily corrected 
by the employer while the inspector secured a warrant.'27 For exam-
ple, employers who have permitted spray-booth ventilating fans, 
designed to remove toxic and flammable substances, to become 
clogged with residues may rapidly restore them to operating condi-
120 [d. 
121 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
122 [d. 
122 Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
IU E.g., United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (D. Del. 
1972). 
125 Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
12' United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 n.12 (D. Del. 
1972). Unannounced inspections comport fully with congressional intent as evidenced in the 
legislative history. 
127 It must be conceded that if the employer successfully and permanently abated an OSHA 
violation after objecting to a warrantless inspection (while a warrant was sought), then the 
purpose of the OSH Act would be furthered. 
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tion and then allow them to deteriorate again after inspection. 128 Or, 
guards on hazardous machines may be turned off or removed by 
individual operators. 12S Moreover, OSHA enforcement may be 
blocked by temporarily disconnecting machines or barricading par-
ticular work areas: proof of a violation requires a showing that work-
ers had access to hazardous machines or areas. 130 
Both the statutory language and legislative history of the OSH 
Act show that unannounced OSHA inspections are essential to the 
purpose of the Act. The inspection provision of the Act requires 
inspectors to enter "without delay."'31 The legislative history indi-
cates that Congress considered the warrantless nature of these 
inspections essential to their effectiveness. During a House debate 
on November 24, 1970, the sponsor of the House bill, Representative 
Steiger, asserted that the "inspector should gain entry to a business 
or work-place with an absolute minimum of delay."'32 Later that 
same day, Steiger stated that "the Secretary, of course, would have 
to act in accordance with applicable constitutional protections."'33 
This statement has been seized upon as evidence that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a warrant for OSHA inspections. '34 The two 
statements by Steiger taken together are inconclusive on the issue, 
but what he intended becomes clear from his remarks in the Con-
gressional Record of January 6, 1977. Commenting on the Bar-
low's, Inc. v. Usery decision'35 that held OSHA's inspections to be 
unconstitutional, Steiger emphatically and unequivocally asserted 
that "the right to make unannounced inspections is the cornerstone 
of the act"138 and "warrantless civil inspections are both absolutely 
essential to this act's enforcement and a long standing Federal prac-
tice. "137 He further noted that no bill was introduced, reported, or 
.20 Brief for Appellants at 39, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted, 430 U.S. 964 
(1977). C{. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.107 (1976). 
'20 Brief for Appellants at 39, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted, 430 U.S. 964 
(1977). C{. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.212, 1910.217 (1976). 
,30 Brief for Appellants at 39, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted, 430 U.S. 964 
(1977). See Brennan v. Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1263-66 (4th Cir. 1974), on 
remand [1975-76] CCH OSHD ~20, 448 (decided February 20, 1976) . 
• 3. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (a) (1970). See text, Section n, supra. 
132 116 CONGo REc. 38, 709 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Steiger). 
'33 [d. 
'" E.g., Brennan V. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 162 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (three 
judge court), appeal docketed, No. 76-1526 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 1976) . 
• 35 Barlow's, Inc. V. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976) . 
• " 123 CONGo REc. H163-64 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Steiger) . 
• 37 [d. 
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passed in either house which did not include such authority, and 
added that Congress had provided for warrantless civil inspections 
in other instances which had withstood attack in the courtS. 138 The 
only other specific reference in the legislative history to the issue of 
warrantless inspections is found in the minority view of six repre-
sentatives which is included in the House Report.139 In a section 
entitled, "Ill-advised inspection provisions," they voice their oppo-
sition to warrantless searches, relying on a Fourth Amendment ar-
gument. 140 The logical inference is that Congress intended warrant-
less inspections. 
The statutory prohibition of advance notice of inspections, 141 cou-
pled with the overriding purpose of the OSH Act,142 indicates that 
the drafters realized that advance notice could frustrate the purpose 
of the inspection because the employer would have time to conceal 
violations of the standards. The House Report sheds light on this 
point: 
Essential to the effective enforcement of this Act is the premise that 
employers will not be forewarned of inspections of their plants. Experi-
ence under the Walsh-Healey Act has indicated that the practice of 
advance notice to an employer has been a prime cause of the breakdown 
in that statute's enforcement provisions. 143 
Thus, the House was aware of the difficulties surrounding advance 
notice in the OSH Act's predecessor and wanted to avoid that prob-
lem. Congress did not want an employer to have a grace period, a 
result which might flow from a warrant requirement, because that 
'''' [d. In addition, Rep. Steiger stated, "And the fact remains that any requirement which 
would permit employers to turn inspectors away during lengthy warrant proceedings thus 
securing time to temporarily conceal or 'clean up' safety and health hazards, would make this 
carefully-considered scheme virtually powerless to reach many injurious working conditions." 
[d. This is the clearest statement of congressional intent on warrantless inspections, but it 
post-dates the legislation by seven years. 
"" H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. 55 (1970) (Comm. Print) at 885 . 
... [d. 
'" The Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651(10) (1970) and the regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6 (1976), 
contain general prohibitions against the giving of advance notice of inspections, "except as 
authorized by the Secretary or his designees." The prohibition is intended, in large part, to 
prevent employers from creating a misleading impression of conditions in an establishment. 
There may be occasions when advance notice is necessary to conduct an effective investiga-
tion within the framework of the Act. These occasions are narrow exceptions to the statutory 
prohibition against advance notice. OSHA Field Operations Manual, reprinted in [19761 1 
EMPLOYEE SAFETY & HEALTH, (CCH) ~4330.3 . 
.. 2 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970) . 
.. " H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 9Ist Congo 2d. Sess. 26-27, (1970) (Comm. Print) at 856-67. 
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would be tantamount to advance notice. Surprise, a factor recog-
nized by the Court in See, 144 is crucial to a routine OSHA inspection 
to ensure that the workplace is inspected in the actual state that 
exists for the employees and not in a readied state for the OSHA 
inspector. 
In comparing a routine OSHA inspection to that in Biswell, an 
OSHA inspection clearly meets three of the considerations: first, the 
OSH Act and regulations sufficiently limit the discretion of the 
inspector; second, the employer does not have a justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy; and third, a warrant would frustrate the purpose of 
the inspection. An OSHA inspection fails to meet the other Biswell 
consideration, pervasive regulation to further a valid public inter-
est, unless it is broadly construed. If the Supreme Court fails to 
adopt this view of pervasive regulation, then the constitutionality 
of the warrantlessness of routine OSHA inspections depends on 
whether all four Biswell factors must be satisfied. 145 Several OSHA 
inspection cases have held that all the factors are needed before the 
Biswell exception to the warrant requirement will control. 148 How-
ever, this seems to be an overly technical approach to the problem 
of the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Pervasive regulation is primarily an indication that the occupant's 
privacy expectation is low. In an OSHA inspection, the privacy 
expectation is already reduced because the areas to be inspected are 
open to employees. Moreover, weighing against this low privacy 
'" See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967). 
OJ' Commentators have viewed the factors differently. One position involves viewing the 
factors in two tiers. First, an urgent federal interest in a pervasively regulated industry must 
be involved, and second, the inspection procedures themselves must be reasonable in time, 
manner, and scope. Only if the first factor is met, need one look at the second. That is, only 
within the context of a qualifying regulatory scheme will the reasonableness of the statute 
be explored. This two tiered approach is developed in Note, Brennan v. Buckeye: Constitu-
tionality of OSHA Warrantless Search, DUKE L.J. 406 (1975). Another approach is to consider 
the factors either independently or dependently. An analysis of the factors as dependent 
would mean that a case would be controlled by Biswell only if it met all of the Biswell factors. 
This distinction is discussed in Comment, OSHA v. The Fourth Amendment: Should Search 
Warrants Be Required for 'Spot Check' Inspections?, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 283 (1977). 
'" See Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976), appeal 
docketed, No. 76-2020 (10th Cir. Oct. 7,1976); Usery v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., 424 F. Supp. 
959 (N.D. Ga. 1977). The court did not consider any other factors because the pervasive 
regulation issue was not met. In Centrif-Air, the court discussed it in terms of the factors 
being cumulative not repetitive. Thus, these two courts viewed the factors dependently al-
though no language in Biswell expressly directs this interpretation. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 
424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), also impliedly used this approach; once the court concluded 
that there was no pervasive regulation it went no further. Direction from the Supreme Court 
is clearly needed at this juncture. 
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expectation are the socially important purposes of the OSH Act and 
the stringent restrictions it places on the inspector's discretion. A 
neutral, detached magistrate seems unnecessary here; hence, the 
warrantlessness of the inspection should be "reasonable" under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
One way of conceptualizing the relaxation of the warrant require-
ment in the OSHA context is to view the statute as taking the place 
of a search warrant as a means of ensuring a "reasonable" search.147 
That is, a carefully circumscribed legislative pronouncement, the 
OSH Act, stands as a substitute for a magistrate's case by case 
determination. u8 A warrant would neither provide the employer 
with any added protection nor further delineate the limits on the 
inspector. 1ft Thus, warrantless OSHA inspections can be viewed as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because they are ade-
quately limited and offer a minimal potential for abuse. 
R. Consequences of a Warrant Requirement 
If the Supreme Court maintains that warrantless OSHA inspec-
tions are unconstitutional, then it could read into the OSH Act a 
warrant requirement for nonconsensual routine inspections. This 
approach was taken by a federal district court in Brennan v. Gib-
son's Products, Inc.,lso and follow~d in several other cases. 151 This 
would conform to the constitutional principle of construing a stat-
ute, if possible, in a manner consistent with the Constitution.152 It 
would conflict with the legislative intent to permit warrantless 
inspections, but the alternative is striking down the OSH Act 
'" This approach was taken in United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141, 
143 (N.D. Okla. 1973). 
". This approach was taken in Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. 
Ohio 1973). 
'" The dissent in Camara·See questioned the effectiveness of warrants issued according to 
flexible probable cause. The dissent envisioned "paper warrants," issued pro forma, and 
affording no meaningful protection. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 554 (1967) (dissent). 
In the alternative, the dissent suggested administrative warrants instead of ones issued by a 
magistrate. [d. at 548 n.l. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, 
J., concurring) (no special facts for magistrate to review). 
, .. 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (three judge court), appeal docketed, No. 76·1526 
(5th Cir. Feb. 27, 1976). 
,., E.g., Usery v. Centrif·Air Machine Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Dunlop v. 
Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76·2020 
(lOth Cir. Oct. 7, 1976); Usery v. Rupp Forge Co., No. 76·385 (N.D. Ohio April 22, 1976), 
appeal docketed, No. 76·1960 (6th Cir. July 21, 1976). 
112 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
Almeida·Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). 
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inspection provisions entirely. 153 
If the Court interprets the OSH Act as requiring a warrant, it 
could salvage some of OSHA's effectiveness by establishing an ex 
parte warrant requirement. The Court has yet to take this route for 
administrative inspections. In Camara, it noted that as a "practical 
matter" warrants would normally be sought after entry is refused. 154 
The See Court specifically refrained from holding that warrants 
could be issued only after entry is denied, recognizing that "surprise 
may often be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business 
establishments."155 An OSHA inspection requires entry "without 
delay," and only an ex parte warrant would make this possible. 
V. CAMARA FLEXIBLE PROBABLE CAUSE ApPLIED TO RoUTINE OSHA 
INSPECTIONS 
Whether or not a warrant is required, no search can be conducted 
except upon probable cause; that is, there must be a constitution-
ally sufficient reason to enter the premises. 15ft As noted earlier, the 
Camara Court introduced a new flexible standard of probable cause 
for administrative inspectionsl57 because traditional probable cause 
would make it impossible to obtain a warrant. Balancing the nature 
of the intrusion against the need for the administrative inspection, 
the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was satisfied if 
there are reasonable legislative or administrative standards for an 
inspection,158 and if a valid public interest is served thereby.150 As 
in Camara and See, the only type of probable cause relevant to a 
routine OSHA inspection is the flexible Camara kind. A routine 
OSHA inspection, by its very nature, means that no specific com-
plaint or information triggered it. Routine OSHA inspections have 
employee safety and health, a valid governmental interest, as their 
,53 Only the Barlow's court, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), found the inspection provi-
sions unconstitutional. See Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873, 880 (D. 
Mont. 1977), for a discussion limiting Barlow's as an "as applied" holding . 
.. , This generality would not apply where there is a citizen complaint or a reason for 
securing immediate entry. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1969). 
,,, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967). 
'" Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-13 (1959). 
'" See text at notes 50-56, supra. 
". Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). 
". [d. at 539. See United States v. Thriftmart, 429 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 1970), for a 
good discussion of Camara probable cause as compared with criminal probable cause. 
Camara probable cause would probably require that the inspector (1) describe agency's 
standard for inspection, (2) allege that standards are reasonable, and (3) present other avail-
able information on condition of building or general area. 
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goal. Further, they are conducted according to the statutory limits 
on time, place, and scope, and an Area Director selects the sites 
according to established procedures. Thus, whenever a business is 
inspected pursuant to the OSH Act, the inspection should meet 
Camara probable cause. 160 
Although this new standard of probable cause for administrative 
inspections was explicitly outlined in Camara, lower courts have 
misapplied it to routine OSHA inspections. In Brennan v. Buckeye 
Industries, Inc.,161 the court commented that the requirement of 
showing probable cause would destroy the object of the OSH Act 
because it would, in effect, "require an employee to report a viola-
tion in order for any. investigation to be made. "162 This view of prob-
able cause is inconsistent with the flexible standard articulated in 
Camara, and is more closely alligned with the traditional standard, 
since it is concerned with whether there is probable cause to believe 
a violation existed in the particular business instead of whether 
there is probable cause to routinely inspect that type of business. IR3 
Indeed, the Barlow '8 164 court was also confused about Camara prob-
able cause. The court's categorical statement that the OSHA 
inspector did not have "any cause, probable or otherwise, to believe 
a violation existed,"165 indicates that the court was using the tradi-
tional standard, because a showing that a violation existed should 
play no role in Camara probable cause. 
In other routine OSHA inspection cases, courts ostensibly apply 
Camara probable cause but do so incorrectly. In Brennan v. Gib-
son's Products, Inc.,166 the court purportedly used "probable cause 
standards appropriate to administrative searches," but did not find 
probable cause for the inspection,167 as there was no reason or cer-
tainty to believe that hazardous working conditions existed in the 
"" The standards suggested by Camara as supporting a finding of probable cause are not 
particularly useful for OSHA inspections. Passage of time is not very helpful because often 
an OSHA inspection has never been done before (unlike periodic housing or fire code inspec-
tions that occur yearly or more frequently). However, the Camara Court only suggested some 
standards relevant to that case, and the standards should be flexible depending on the type 
of inspection. 
'" 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). 
'" [d. at 1354. 
'" The court reported that "no probable cause for a search warrant was attempted." [d. 
at 135l. 
'" Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976). 
'" [d. at 438-39. 
IO' 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (three judge court), appeal docketed, No. 76-1526 
(5th Cir. Feb. 27, 1976). 
'" [d. at 162. 
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area to be searched.118 Camara, however, would not require reason 
to believe that a violation definitely existed. In Dunlop v. Hertzler 
Enterprises, Inc.,168 the court was clearly aware of a different stan-
dard of probable cause for administrative inspections,170 but still 
applied it incorrectly. When the employer objected to the routine 
OSHA inspections, the inspector obtained a warrant from a magis-
trate that ordered entry, inspection, and investigation. The court 
observed that "no showing of probable cause was made as a basis 
for issuance of the warrant."171 In a footnote it was added that the 
warrant application included only a recitation of the OSHA inspec-
tion provisions as authority for the proposed inspection, plus state-
ments that the inspection was necessary to determine compliance 
with OSHA and that OSHA inspectors previously had been denied 
entry. 172 The warrant itself, the court complained, "contained a con-
clusory assertion that reasonable legislative and administrative 
standards had been proposed for the inspection."173 The facts pro-
vided to obtain this warrant, however, were exactly the sort of infor-
mation that should satisfy Camara probable cause. In Usery v. 
Centrif-Air Machine Co., Inc.,174 the court analyzed probable cause, 
as Camara had, as a "balancing of the need to search against the 
intrusion which searching would entail,"175 but then concluded that 
there was no basis for issuing a warrant. 17S In a footnote, it men-
tioned that the inspection site had been selected on a "semi-
random" basis, that no complaint had been filed, and that the only 
pertinent criterion raised at the evidentiary hearing was that the 
site had not been inspected previously.177 This information, too, 
should be sufficient to meet Camara probable cause. Most recently, 
in Marshall v. Shellcast, Corp., 178 a federal district court used 
Camara probable cause, but refused to allow OSHA to rely on na-
"K Id. The approach taken in Gibson's Products was followed in Usery 1I. Rupp Forge Co., 
No. C-76-385 (N.D. Ohio April 22, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1960 (6th Cir. July 21, 
1976). Consequently, the same errors made in Gibson's Products concerning a showing of 
probable cause were duplicated by the court in Rupp Forge. 
"' 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976), appeal docketed No. 76-2020 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 1976). 
170 Id. at 630. 
171 Id. at 629. 
172 Id. at 629 n.3. 
173 Id. 
IU 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
I7S Id. at 961 nA, quoting from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
171 Usery v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 959, 961 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
177 Id. at 961 n.3. See also In re Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1977). 
17M Marshall v. Shellcast Corp., No. 77-P-0995-E, (N.D. Ala. July 26, 1977). 
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tional statistics for occupational injuries and illnesses within the 
iron and steel foundry industry to establish probable cause. The 
court ruled that more individualized figures for the particular com-
pany must be reported to the magistrate. 17B The court was critical 
of OSHA for not attempting to obtain statistics for the specific 
businesses, yet arguably Camara probable cause would not require 
individual statistics.180 
Clearly, then, Camara probable cause has led to confusion and 
inconsistency in its application by lower courts. However, it has not 
been totally misapplied; in Marshall v. Chromolloy Corp.,181 the 
court based its finding of Camara probable cause on the potentially 
hazardous nature of the business and the general purpose of the 
OSH Act. 182 This case correctly demonstrates that as long as a rou-
tine OSHA inspection is conducted according to the carefully lim-
ited statutory and administrative standards, Camara probable 
cause should be satisfied. . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately what the Supreme Court must determine in Marshall 
v. Barlow's, Inc. is whether a warrantless routine OSHA inspection 
violates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable 
searches. Barlow's provides the Court with an opportunity to settle 
several important issues. Regarding the standard of probable cause, 
the Court should declare unequivocally that Camara probable cause 
is the appropriate standard for routine OSHA inspections. Since 
OSHA case law is replete with examples of misapplication of 
Camara, the Court must explain what factual showing is needed to 
satisfy Camara probable cause in the OSHA context. On the issue 
of the warrant requirement, the Court should clarify the relation-
ship of the Biswell considerations, specifically whether all four are 
needed for Biswell to control, and should explain the term 
"pervasive regulation." In sum, warrantless OSHA inspections 
should be upheld as a reasonable means to promote the valid and 
crucial government interest in the health and safety of all working 
people. 
17. Shellcast Corp. was chosen as part of National Emphasis Program that selected the' iron 
and steel foundry industry as a target industry for OSHA. This was based on the high 
incidence of occupational accidents and illness in this industry. 
1MB The Shellcast decision is a narrow one, maintaining only that if individualized informa-
tion on occupational accidents and diseases exists, then OSHA cannot base its probable cause 
on national figures for the industry. 
IMI 433 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Wisc. 1977). 
102 [d. at 333. 
